Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2023

Zambia

Partly Free
59
100
A Obstacles to Access 15 25
B Limits on Content 24 35
C Violations of User Rights 20 40
Last Year's Score & Status
58 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the research methodology and report acknowledgements.

header1 Overview

Internet freedom in Zambia improved slightly during the coverage period. Internet access was disrupted for several weeks due to drought-related hydroelectric power shortages. Meanwhile, however, the entry of a new mobile-network operator and the launch of the country’s first 5G network resulted in greater access to quality internet service. President Hakainde Hichilema abolished a section of the penal code that had criminalized defamation of the president, but authorities continued to arrest and imprison internet users who criticized Hichilema online. Such cases contributed to an enduring environment of self-censorship in Zambia. Civil society and media groups reiterated calls for comprehensive reforms to protect freedom of expression.

Zambia’s political system features regular multiparty elections, though political rights and civil liberties are constrained by limits on free expression, including limits on the right to demonstrate and government pressure on media. Opposition parties have faced onerous legal and practical obstacles to fair competition.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2022 - May 31, 2023

  • Power shortages due to low water levels at a hydroelectric plant on the Kariba Dam following a drought disrupted telecommunications service from December 2022 to February 2023 (see A1).
  • MTN, in partnership with the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, launched Zambia’s first fifth-generation (5G) technology for mobile network service in six major cities in November 2022 (see A1).
  • A fourth mobile operator, ZedMobile, launched operations in Zambia in December 2022 (see A4).
  • Section 67 of the Penal Code Act, which made defamation of the president a criminal offense and had been used to suppress free expression, was abolished in December 2022 (see C2).
  • Two TikTok users were sentenced to two years in prison with hard labor for allegedly insulting the president in a video in June 2022 (see C3).

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 2.002 6.006

Zambia was among the early adopters of the internet in sub-Saharan Africa with the installation of dial-up and satellite technology at the University of Zambia in the early 1990s, though access has grown slowly since then. As of December 2022, there were 11.1 million internet users in Zambia, representing a 56.9 percent penetration rate, according to the Zambia Information and Communications Technology Authority (ZICTA).1 In contrast, DataReportal’s Digital 2023 report identifies an internet penetration rate of 21.2 percent representing 4.3 million internet users.2

The vast majority of internet users in Zambia rely on mobile internet subscriptions due to low costs of access as compared to fixed-line subscriptions, with 11.1 million subscribers as of December 2022, according to ZICTA data.3

Despite increasing access, internet connection speeds are still slow. In March 2023, average download speeds were 17.13 megabits per second (Mbps) on mobile connections and 8.83 Mbps on fixed-line broadband connections,4 representing an improvement from the download speeds of 10.27 Mbps and 7.85 Mbps recorded in July 2022 for mobile and fixed-line subscriptions, respectively.5

In September 2020, ZICTA fined Airtel, MTN, and Zamtel—the three mobile service providers active in the country—for providing poor service to subscribers. Airtel was fined 4.8 million kwacha ($281,000), Zamtel was fined 450,000 kwacha ($26,000), and MTN was fined 225,000 kwacha ($13,000).6 In October 2022, Science and Technology Minister Felix Mutati called for an ICT sector “reboot” and investigation into poor network connectivity.7

Low water levels at Kariba Dam following a season of drought prompted the closing of a hydroelectric power plant, which resulted in power shortages in Zambia starting in December 2022.8 Resulting power shortages disrupted telecommunications services in some areas of the country, though power cuts became less severe by February 2023.9

The “Smart Zambia” plan aims to develop information communications and technology (ICT) infrastructure to bolster the economy and ultimately make the country’s ICT sector globally competitive. Huawei was contracted to upgrade Zambia’s state-owned mobile-tower network for fifth-generation (5G) mobile service in May 2019.10 MTN, in partnership with Huawei, launched the country’s first 5G service platform11 in November 2022.12 The program aimed to enhance connectivity and speed on its network in six major cities, covering about 15 percent of the Zambian population, with plans to expand 5G coverage to all of Lusaka, Kitwe, and Ndola by the middle of 2023.13

Continued development of ICT infrastructure in the country has increased access. In 2022, the total number of communication towers stood at 3,548, a 2.6 percent increase from the number recorded in 2021. The number of LTE/4G telecommunication sites increased by 11.4 percent in 2022 while the number of 2G and 3G sites increased by about 1.0 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively.14 Meanwhile, the government’s Universal Access Fund has helped pay for more than 1,000 base stations countrywide,15 increasing mobile coverage to 101 percent of the population as of 2022.16 As of July 2021, 1,009 of the towers had been built, though delays prevented the rest from being completed by the government’s targeted deadline of the end of that year.17 Other initiatives by technology companies, internet service providers (ISPs), and mobile providers are expected to increase broadband penetration, including the deployment of WiMax (worldwide interoperability for microwave access) wireless broadband, and fiber to the premises (FTTP).

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 1.001 3.003

Access to the internet in Zambia is still prohibitively expensive for some people, particularly among marginalized rural communities and lower-income individuals.

The high costs of ICT ownership, digital literacy, and access to internet services remain major barriers to access, especially in rural areas.1 During the coverage period, Zamtel was the most affordable internet service provider (ISP), offering monthly 5.5 GB internet bundles at 60 kwacha ($3.50) per day.2 According to Cable, a UK-based consultancy, the average price of 1 GB of data in Zambia was $1.36 in May 2022.3

Other mobile companies offer promotional data plans, such as social bundles that allow users unlimited access to social media platforms for a daily, weekly, or monthly period. Internet freedom advocates have criticized the practice of charging internet users different rates to access different content and services for violating the principle of net neutrality, though the promotions encourage internet use and help expand access in low-income areas. Airtel also offers Facebook Free Basics, which allows users to access a simplified version of Facebook for free and enables access to other websites, such as Wikipedia, WikiHow, AccuWeather, Go Zambia Jobs, and the Mobile Alliance for Maternal Action.4 In 2017, MTN launched Facebook Flex, a service that allows subscribers to access the full version of Facebook for free.5

Despite the introduction of less expensive social bundles, including for students using educational tools online, and free Facebook, affordability remains a concern for many Zambians. According to the World Bank, as of 2015, 61 percent of the Zambian population lived below the international poverty line of $2.15 per day.6 Zambia ranked 48 out of 72 countries in the 2021 Affordability Drivers Index published by the World Wide Web Foundation, and 71 out of 100 countries on price in the 2022 Inclusive Internet Index published by the Economist, measuring costs of internet access relative to income.7

In July 2019, the parliament adopted a motion to prohibit internet providers from prescribing expiry dates on data bundles to protect consumers and enhance digital inclusion.8 As a result, all three mobile service providers now offer expiry and non-expiry data bundles to customers.9 Consumer advocates have complained that the non-expiry bundles target high-income individuals because of the pricing structure.10

While access to ICTs is steadily increasing, rural areas have lagged due to the high costs of hardware and software, poor network coverage, and high levels of illiteracy. The government and service providers have invested few resources toward expanding ICT infrastructure in rural areas. Erratic and expensive electricity presents an additional obstacle to access in rural areas, where only about 14 percent of residents had access to electricity as of 2020, compared to 82 percent of the urban population.11

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 5.005 6.006

The government has previously restricted connectivity during contested elections and periods of political tension, including in August 2021, when social media platforms were blocked.

Following conflicting reports1 about whether authorities would restrict internet connectivity,2 on August 12, 2021—election day—WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, and Messenger were blocked on most networks for two days, apparently in response to an order from ZICTA (see B1).3 These platforms are the main sources of information and communication for Zambians, especially Zambian youth.4 On August 15, 2021, the High Court ordered connectivity to be restored after local human rights group Chapter One Foundation sued ZICTA.5

In February 2020, the internet was inaccessible for two days in Southern Province.6 Government authorities attributed the disruption to seasonal rains,7 but the disruption occurred during a period of political tension in Zambia related to a series of gas attacks.8 Officials with the then opposition United Party for National Development (UPND)9 speculated that the shutdown was politically motivated, as the area was a UPND stronghold.10

After the disputed presidential election in August 2016, mobile broadband networks were reportedly disrupted for between 48 and 72 hours in regions where opposition supporters held protests, at which they accused the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) of voter fraud.11 Two mobile providers—MTN and Airtel—confirmed the disruptions but did not explain them, leaving it unclear whether the outage was ordered by the government.12

Partial state ownership of the country’s fiber backbone and state control over connections to the international internet may enable the government to restrict connectivity at will.13 As a landlocked country, Zambia’s national fiber backbone is provided by three operators: the state-owned Zamtel, the state-owned ZESCO,14 and the privately owned Liquid Intelligent Technologies.15 Zamtel operates the fiber-optic connection to two international submarine cables: the West African Cable System (WACS) and the South Atlantic 3 (SAT–3).16 MTN and Airtel lease access to the undersea cables from Zamtel, while MTN also connects directly to the Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSy).17 There is one internet exchange point (IXP) in the country.18 According to a 2013 report from the Zambian Watchdog, an online investigative journalism outlet, the IXP is reportedly housed in the same building as Zamtel in Lusaka, which may further enable government influence over domestic internet traffic.19

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 5.005 6.006

The diversity of service providers is not significantly limited by legal or economic obstacles, and Zambia’s fourth mobile provider, Zedmobile (formerly Beeline) began operations during the coverage period. The subscriber base in the country continues to grow as service providers introduce new products to the market and the government grants licenses to new entrants.

The Zambian ICT sector is one of the fastest growing in the country, playing a significant role in agriculture, health, media, mobile banking, governance, and education. The Zambian market for ISPs is competitive, with 19 ISPs active as of the last quarter of 2022, according to ZICTA. Three ISPs are also mobile service providers: MTN, Airtel, and Zamtel.1

All internet and mobile service providers are privately owned, with the exception of Zamtel, which was renationalized in 2012.2

At the end of 2022, Zamtel maintained the smallest share in the mobile market, with 13.7 percent of unique mobile subscriptions,3 though it has historically commanded a much larger share of fixed-line subscriptions.4 It is also the only mobile operator that offers landline telephone service, with about 96,000 subscriptions. MTN held 36 percent of unique mobile subscriptions as of December 2022, while Airtel, the dominant player, held 50.2 percent.5

In February 2021, ZICTA granted the country’s fourth mobile service provider license to Beeline Telecom, a Zambian company. The company’s ownership structure is unclear.6 Beeline received an extension from ZICTA to begin operations in June 2022, after it failed to start operations due to delays it attributed to COVID-19.7 The provider commenced operations in December 2022, trading as Zedmobile,8 which is expected to launch 4G and 5G services.9

In 2017, the cabinet approved the introduction of a new converged licensing framework, which decentralized the provision of network and service licenses in order to enhance competition and ultimately lower tariffs.10 Consequently, ZICTA has issued 11 licenses in the ICT sector as of December 2022, bringing the total number of valid licenses to 84.11 ZICTA has licensed Starlink to provide satellite internet services in Zambia; the network had not yet begun operations by the end of the coverage period.12

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 2.002 4.004

The independence of the national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers is undermined by the legal framework that guides their activities. ZICTA is the main regulatory body for the ICT and postal-service sectors, established under the Information and Communication Technologies Act of 20091 and the Postal Services Act of 2009.2 ZICTA is nominally an independent and autonomous body.3 However, both acts provide opportunities for the minister of transport and communications—who oversees ZICTA’s activities and appoints the members and chairperson of its board4 —to interfere with its operations.

Following the August 2021 internet shutdown, Chapter One Foundation and ZICTA entered into a landmark consent agreement in March 2022, where ZICTA agreed not to act outside of its legal authority. In addition, the regulator agreed to inform the public of the reason for any internet access disruption within 36 hours of such an incident.5

In February 2022, five directors of ZICTA were fired, allegedly for their involvement in the decision to block social media platforms during the August 2021 elections (see A3 and B1).6 In May 2021, the ZICTA board declined to renew the contract of Director General Patrick Mutimushi. The news site Zambian Watchdog alleged that the decision resulted from disagreement over the implementation of the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act (CSCCA) (see C2), while the Zambia Business Times attributed it to dissatisfaction with the Uzi Mobile withdrawal (see A4). A new seven-member board of ZICTA was appointed in October 2022 by Felix Mutati, minister of science and technology.7 A new director general, Choolwe Nalubamba, was appointed in March 2023.8

In September 2021, the Ministry of Technology and Science was created to develop the technology and science sectors, as well as oversee all ICT functions, which were previously under the former ministry of transport and communications.9 The Ministry of Technology and Science began revising the 2007 National ICT Policy and developing a National Digital Transformation Strategy in 2022. Both documents are expected to be completed in 2023.

Some internet content is also regulated by the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), which oversees the enforcement of regulations in broadcast programming, including content that television and radio stations make available online.10

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 6.006 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 5 to 6 because, in contrast to previous coverage periods, social media and communications platforms remained accessible during the most recent coverage period.

The government has restricted online content in the past. On election day in August 2021, WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, and Messenger were blocked on most networks, apparently in response to an order from ZICTA. Zambians responded by advocating for the use of circumvention tools to access the blocked platforms.1 Access to all platforms was restored two days later, on August 14, after the High Court issued a stay on ZICTA’s blocking order in response to a lawsuit filed by the Chapter One Foundation (see A5).2

In 2018, a parliamentary committee on media, information, and communications technologies submitted a report before the parliament stating that neither ZICTA nor the IBA had the authority to regulate the use of social media platforms. The committee chairperson said, “regulatory agencies [should] devise means of regulating and censoring of undesirable content on social media and not to shut down social media since they have no capacity to regulate them.”

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

The government has been known to censor content by directing online media editors to remove material considered problematic or offensive upon request.

In May 2020, a popular Facebook group called ZNBC Top Stories was removed from the platform for unknown reasons. Many of the users, who formed new groups with similar names, alleged that that ZICTA closed the group because of its support for then opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema.1 In July 2020, a Facebook group with a similar name also reported being removed.2

There has only been one removal request from the Zambian government to Google since the company began publishing its transparency reports. The request was made in December 2015, and the content was requested to be removed because it allegedly contained impersonations.3

Intermediaries are not held liable for content under the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 2021 (ECT Act).4 However, under the earlier 2009 version of the law, state agencies reportedly approached intermediaries without following legal procedures in the name of upholding security and morality.5

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 3.003 4.004

Restrictions on internet and digital content are largely transparent and proportional. For instance, under the ECT Act, service providers are required to remove content only with a court order or on receipt of a detailed complaint alleging a violation of a user’s rights; the act also establishes a dispute mechanism for such takedowns.1

The Patriotic Front (PF) government passed and reviewed laws on cybersecurity and cybercrime, data protection, and electronic commerce and transactions2 that it said were aimed at promoting online safety. However, the laws were criticized by stakeholders for being enacted without sufficient public comment and expert input (see C2).3 President Hakainde Hichilema’s government in May 2022 announced plans to amend the act,4 and stakeholder consultations commenced in September 2022, with a draft expected by the end of 2023.5

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 2.002 4.004

Growing government pressure on the media in recent years had led to increased self-censorship among journalists, both online and offline. Journalists, bloggers, and to a lesser extent, everyday social media users increasingly write anonymously or pseudonymously to avoid harassment or the threat of legal action,1 particularly on issues regarding politics and corruption involving government officials. Social media users may also restrict their communications to a private circle instead of sharing information publicly, especially after the enactment of the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act (CSCCA) (see C2).2 Most independent online news sites do not publicly share their addresses, ownership, management, or the actual names of their reporters, practices that stem in large part from fears of harassment.

A survey by Afrobarometer—an African-led series of national public attitude surveys on democracy and governance in Africa—published in 2023 found that a majority of Zambian respondents believed that people need to be cautious about what they say about politics.3 Previous polling had revealed an increasing percentage of people who watched what they said about politics, and that only a third of respondents were comfortable criticizing the president.4

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 2.002 4.004

Both the former ruling party, the Lungu-led Patriotic Front (PF), and the UPND heavily rely on online resources, particularly social media, to advance their political agendas. Ahead of the August 2021 general elections, there was a proliferation of both progovernment and opposition content online, including websites, social media pages, and WhatsApp groups.

Ahead of the August 2021 general elections, PF and UPND supporters used social media, blogs, and other online tools to express their views.1 Both progovernment and opposition social media accounts have been known to publish misinformation and false news. False news disguised to look like real reports or government statements has become a more prominent feature of the online information landscape in the past few years. Both the PF and UPND were accused of spreading misinformation to shape the outcome of the August 2021 elections.2

Upon assuming office, in March 2022 President Hichilema warned against social media abuse, saying platforms were “used to spread hate speech, commit crime, and corrupt the morals of the country,” as well as to spread fake news.3 He said his government would not restrict social media access, but would instead enforce relevant laws to curb abuse.

An investigative article published in April 2020 disclosed that the PF’s 2018–21 strategic plan aimed at establishing a media intelligence unit for covert operations. This included equipping the PF’s media center with permanent bloggers, hackers, and reporters to control their narrative.4 Laura Miti, a political commentator and activist, noted that troll accounts created on Facebook and Twitter in May and June 2020 appeared to push the PF’s agenda and attack its opponents. Most of the accounts used names of people belonging to the same ethnic group as Hichilema.5

Government institutions and agencies routinely regulate the online activity of employees or other affiliated people by threatening discipline or termination. In April 2020, the University of Zambia (UNZA) announced that it planned to make it a dismissible offense for lecturers and other staff members to use social media to post libelous materials likely to bring the university into disrepute.6

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

While blogs hosted on international platforms such as WordPress have proliferated in recent years, online publications face economic constraints that compromise their ability to remain financially sustainable. The government is the largest source of advertising revenue for traditional media outlets and has been known to withhold advertisements from critical outlets.

The African Media Barometer 2021 noted that Zambia’s advertisers, in an effort to please the government, placed 80 percent of their advertisements in state-owned media rather than private media.1 Private companies often do not advertise in news outlets that seem antagonistic to government policies out of fear of the potential repercussions.

In August 2020, the Independent Broadcasting Agency (IBA), the broadcasting regulator, said that online broadcasters would have to apply for licenses from the authority and be subject to its regulations. Legal experts criticized the IBA’s claim, arguing that Zambian law designates ZICTA as the sole regulator with authority over the internet.2 The IBA’s statement followed an inquiry as to whether Prime TV, a popular television station known for its criticism of the PF government, could operate exclusively online.3 (The IBA had delicensed Prime TV in March 2020,4 though Hichilema restored its license in August 2021 after taking office.5 )

The IBA once again urged online broadcasters to register with it in March 2021.6 No broadcasters registered, however, because there was no framework for applying for the licenses.

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

There are a variety of viewpoints and independent information sources in Zambia’s online information landscape. However, there is less content produced by and relevant to women, rural populations, and marginalized groups such as LGBT+ people and people with disabilities.

Online content producers face considerably less government pressure than their traditional media counterparts, possibly because some web platforms allow them to publish anonymously and the ICT regulator does not have the full capacity to control them. As a result, social media platforms and citizen journalists have emerged as important sources of diverse information, and news consumers have become increasingly aware of alternative, diverse voices from online sources. Most online media houses’ content is in English.1

The Zambian blogosphere and social media are vibrant, representing diverse, critical viewpoints and opposition voices, and many mainstream journalists have turned to social media to express themselves more freely and publish articles and commentaries that would not be allowed by media houses. Zambian Bloggers Network and Bloggers of Zambia are currently the main civil society groups pushing for digital and bloggers’ rights through training, advocacy, and activism. Facebook remains the most popular social media platform among Zambians, with 2.6 million users according to the Digital 2023 report.2

Zambia’s online information space is not always reliable, however, in part because supporters of political parties often post false or misleading content on social media; this was especially pronounced ahead of the August 2021 general elections (see B5). Ahead of the 2021 election, the Panos Institute of Southern Africa launched a fact-checking initiative in partnership with the UPND to verify online information regarding the election.3

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 4.004 6.006

Mobilization platforms are generally available to users, and social media continues to play an important role in facilitating political and social debates and discussions. However, fear of arrest and prosecution can stifle online activism.

Political parties and activists used social media and held virtual rallies to mobilize ahead of the August 2021 general elections.1 Campaigning remained primarily offline, however, even despite limits placed on such activities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and sporadic outbreaks of violence between PF and UPND supporters.2

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 2.002 6.006

The constitution and a number of laws threaten freedom of expression and other key rights online. The Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act of 20161 lacked many of the constitutional provisions sought by citizens, including the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.2

A constitutional referendum was held in 2016, alongside elections, to seek voter approval of new amendments to the constitution’s Bill of Rights that provide specific protections for print, broadcast, and electronic media freedom, and explicitly prohibit the government from exercising control over or interfering with media activities.3 Though approved by 71 percent of voters, the referendum failed to reach the threshold of 50 percent turnout required to validate the results.4

Local journalists and civil society groups have called for President Hakainde Hichilema to institute press freedom reforms by revising problematic laws that inhibit journalistic work, including the CSCCA and the Penal Code,5 which gives the president “absolute discretion” to ban publications regarded as “contrary to the public interest.”6 In February 2023, the government announced plans to hold another referendum to amend Part III of the Zambian Constitution to enhance the Bill of Rights.7

In March 2019, then information and broadcasting services minister and chief government spokesperson Dora Siliya announced that the cabinet approved the Access to Information Bill, which has been pending since 2002.8 The bill was still being considered at the end of the coverage period although the UPND government has made several pronouncements promising to enact the bill and began holding stakeholder consultations in 2022.9

Judicial independence is guaranteed in the constitution but is not respected in practice, and is undermined by other laws that allow for executive interference in the justice system. For instance, then president Lungu warned Constitutional Court judges in 2017 against disqualifying him from running for a third term in 2021, despite the constitutionally mandated two-term limit.10 The Constitutional Court ultimately ruled in Lungu’s favor.11

Constitutional protections have been seriously undermined in the past, such as when Lungu declared a state of emergency from July to October 2017 that prohibited public meetings, closed roads, imposed curfews, and restricted movements.12 Though no specific limits were placed on online activities, critics believed the move was an effort by the then president to tighten his grip on power.

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

Despite the abolition of clauses in the penal code that criminalized defamation of the president during the coverage period,1 laws that prescribe harsh prison terms for online activity continue to limit freedom of expression in Zambia.

In a landmark decision, President Hichilema abolished the defamation of the president law under Section 69 of the Penal Code Act in December 2022. 2 The archaic law was historically used to silence, intimidate, detain, and arrest journalists, activists, citizens, and political opponents, including for online offences.

Critics remain concerned that other laws, such as the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act (CSCCA), could still be used to persecute people if not reviewed. Lungu signed the CSCCA, which enacts a range of changes relating to cybersecurity, online activities, and telecommunications surveillance, in March 2021 (see C5 and C6). Several of its provisions may restrict political, social, and cultural speech online. These include Section 59, which bars the production and distribution of content “tending to corrupt morals” and which carries a fine of up to 3,000 kwacha ($175) if violated. Section 69 criminalizes the use of electronic communication to “coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause emotional distress to a person” without defining those terms, and violators face a fine of up to 150,000 kwacha ($8,800), up to 5 years’ imprisonment, or both. Section 67 bars the disclosure of details relating to orders in a criminal investigation, without a public interest exception that would safeguard reporting on law enforcement investigations relevant to the public; the provision carries a penalty of up to 5 years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to 150,000 kwacha, or both.3

The CSCCA also bans the use of a computer to disseminate hate speech, which is broadly defined in the law; violators face up to 2 years imprisonment and a fine of 150,000 kwacha. The production and distribution of pornography carries harsh penalties, including a fine of 300,000 kwacha ($17,500) and up to 10 years’ imprisonment for the production of pornography for sale using a computer. 4

Offenses under the CSCCA may be prosecuted extraterritorially, if the purported damage occurs within Zambia but the alleged perpetrator and the computers used to facilitate the offense are not located in the country.5

In May 2021, the parliament assented to the Electoral Process (Amendment) Act 2021, which implements several reforms to Zambian election laws. The act imposes penalties on those who “without lawful authority announce and declare the results of an election.”6 Transparency International Zambia noted that this provision applies to media, civil society organizations, and individuals.7 The breadth of the provision raised concerns that it would be used to restrict online speech about the election results, though no such cases were publicly reported in the 2021 elections.

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

Individuals face arrests and prosecution in retaliation for their online activity, specifically for posts that allegedly defame the president.

In November 2022, opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) spokesperson Saboi Imboela was arrested on charges of libel and hate speech after making a Facebook post that criticized the president’s media director.1 She was released on bail after three days in police custody.2

In September 2022, Lawrence Bwalya Muchinda, a Lusaka resident, was arrested by police for allegedly issuing defamatory remarks against President Hichilema on TikTok.3 In the same month, police arrested opposition Patriots for Economic Progress (PeP) leader Sean Tembo, for allegedly insulting the president on Facebook. Tembo was granted bail after six days of detention.4 His trial was set to begin in October 2022.5 In April 2023, Tembo was sued by a former cabinet secretary and the attorney general for making disparaging comments about president Hichilema on Facebook; Tembo then asked the Constitutional Court to dismiss the matter, claiming that it does not have jurisdiction in the case.6

In June 2022, Chienge residents Danny Kapambwe and Justine Chimpinde were sentenced to 24 months in prison with hard labor for defamation of the president after allegedly verbally insulting him in a TikTok video.7

In April 2022, Eric Chiyuka, a journalist with the online CIC Press, was taking photographs and videos of a physical altercation between police officers and members of a church. When Chiyuka refused a town official’s orders to stop taking pictures, the official physically assaulted him (see C7). Later that day, officers tried to arrest Chiyuka; he refused to take police transport and instead went to the station himself, where he was detained for 48 hours and charged with two counts of assault.8 The same month, two Patriotic Front bloggers, Joshua Malama and Victor Kapungwe, were taken to police offices for questioning and investigation.9 And, in April 2022, Andsen Zulu was sentenced to one year in prison for defamation after stating that the president was an atheist in a Facebook post.10

In July 2020, a court rejected an appeal to seek a ruling from the High Court and Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of defamation charges.11

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

The government does not place restrictions on encryption tools, but some government regulations threaten anonymous communications. Encryption tools used to prevent unauthorized access by a third party are uncommon in Zambia. They are mostly used by journalists and human rights defenders.

The 2021 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECT Act) asserts no limitation on the use of encryption. Section 88 of the 2021 legislation prohibits the unauthorized release of a decryption key and the unauthorized release of data, while Section 89 prohibits the use of encryption to obstruct a law enforcement officer, punishable by up to 2 years in prison, a fine up to 60,000 kwacha ($3,500), or both.1

The ECT Act establishes a register of all cryptography providers. Unless they are registered with ZICTA—which is designated as the National Root Certification Authority (NCRA) by the ECT Act—a person cannot provide cryptographic services or products. Provision of cryptography services without registration is a criminal offense, punishable by imprisonment of up to 5 years, a fine of up to 150,000 kwacha ($8,800), or both.2

Anonymous communication through digital media is compromised by SIM card registration requirements instituted in 2012.3 Registration requires an original and valid identity card, such as a national registration card, to be presented in person to the mobile service provider.4 While the government stated that the registration requirements were instituted to combat crime,5 investigative reports from 2012 found that subscriber details may be passed directly to the secret service for the creation of a mobile phone user database.6 Fearing infringements on their privacy, some activists, politicians, and investigative journalists have used preregistered SIM cards. The practice, however, is a criminal offense in the country. Cybercafés do not require user registration.

Online anonymity is further compromised by the CSCCA (see C2). The law requires telecommunications companies to collect the full name, address, and identity number of all subscribers (see C2, C5, and C6).7

Despite the lack of implementing regulations (see C6), the government in March 2022 proceeded to develop and introduce a digital identity system known as the Integrated National Registration Information System (INRIS) to replace the paper and manual national registration system.8

Registration for the .zm country code top-level domain (ccTLD) is managed by ZICTA, through its designation as the NCRA under the ECT Act, which may compromise the anonymity of .zm website owners, given the questionable independence of the regulatory authority.9 Almost all independent online news sites use the .com domain, which may stem from historical distrust of ZICTA. The ECT Act also provides the minister in charge of communications with the authority to regulate domain name registration.10 Such direct oversight of local web domains may allow the government to access user data belonging to local content creators and hosts.

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

Little is known about the Zambian government’s surveillance practices, though there is evidence that authorities are working to build their surveillance capabilities.

The CSCCA (see C2), passed in March 2021, establishes new authorities under which the government can compel telecommunications companies to intercept data (see C6). The law also grants ZICTA, which is designated as the enforcement authority under the law, to appoint inspectors who may search and seize computer systems on receipt of a warrant.1

A December 2020 report by Citizen Lab identified the Zambian government as a likely customer of Circles, a surveillance company that allows customers to monitor calls, texts, and cell phone geolocation by exploiting weaknesses in mobile telecommunications infrastructure.2

In a March 2020 state of the nation address, then president Lungu noted that ZICTA and Zambian police are able to track down so-called social media “abusers.”3 The Zambian Business Times, a local media house, reached out to ZICTA to confirm the installation of equipment to track down social media users. The regulator referred the query to the Zambia Police, who did not provide further comment.4

In February 2018, the Zambian Watchdog reported that Huawei had begun connecting government buildings in Lusaka under the Smart Zambia project,5 raising concerns about potential digital surveillance given the company’s close ties to the Chinese government, which operates a vast surveillance apparatus.6 The chairperson of the Civil Service Commission had warned civil servants that the Smart Zambia project would allow the government to trace discussions of political issues on social media.7 In August 2022, Home Affairs and Internal Security Minister Jack Mwiimbu, confirmed that the ministry was moving forward with a controversial closed-circuit television (CCTV) camera project in partnership with ZTE, which was reported as being 98 percent complete (See C6).8

In a 2018 report by Citizen Lab, Zambia is listed as one of 45 countries worldwide in which devices were likely breached by Pegasus, a targeted spyware developed by Israeli technology firm NSO Group. Pegasus is known to be used by some governments to spy on journalists, human rights defenders, and opposition members, though it is unclear if the Zambian government is a Pegasus client.9

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Service providers and technology companies are required by law to assist the government in the lawful interception of communications. The law gives the government significant powers to compel service providers to monitor communications with limited oversight.

In August 2022, Zambia launched the $210 million Safe City Project in partnership with the Chinese government and tech giant ZTE.1 Since its announcement in 2019, the Safe City project drew substantial concerns from civil society over its potential for abuse and mass surveillance, particularly due to past revelations that the Zambian government has collaborated closely with Chinese technology companies to monitor electronic communications. An August 2019 article published by the Wall Street Journal disclosed that Huawei technicians embedded within ZICTA helped the government access phones and Facebook pages belonging to opposition bloggers, as well as to intercept the communications of criminal suspects, opposition supporters, activists, and journalists. A spokesperson for the PF said that ZICTA and Huawei helped to track down “perpetrators of fake news” and to neutralize opposition news sites.2

In March 2021, Zambia passed the Data Protection Act 2021, which establishes a strong set of data protections for Zambians. The data rights established under the law are broad, including special protections for sensitive data, though it provides similarly broad exceptions for criminal investigations and national security purposes. The act requires personal data to be stored in Zambia, with cross-border data transfer subject to review by the data protection commissioner.3 Civil society organizations have raised concerns about the independence of the data protection commissioner, who reports to the minister in charge of communications, and the investigative powers afforded to authorities under the law.4 The Data Protection Act entered into effect in March 2021,5 though the minister of technology and science has not yet issued implementing regulations or appointed a data protection commissioner by the end of the coverage period.

In November 2021, the government ratified the African Union (AU) Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection (Malabo Convention), which calls on signatories to establish data protections.6

The CSCCA (see C2) establishes new authorities under which the government can compel telecommunications companies to intercept data, hand over stored communications, and install monitoring systems. Companies may be compelled to do so with a court order, a warrant, or both, depending on the type of monitoring, though the law also permits broad exceptions to those safeguards.7 Separately, the law requires telecommunications companies to collect the full names, addresses, and identity numbers of all subscribers, limiting online anonymity (see C4).8

The CSCCA also mandates data localization of “critical information,” which is not designated in the law as written. The act empowers the minister of technology and science to declare information that is of “importance to the protection of national security, economic or social wellbeing of the republic” as critical information. In addition to localization, the minister can impose additional oversight and requirements on infrastructure related to critical information.9

In its May 2021 analysis of the CSCCA, the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) noted that the provisions for communications interception do not adequately impose safeguards for privacy. For instance, the law does not limit the period of validity for interception orders, opening the door to long-term surveillance, nor does it adequately protect collected data from abuse by officials who have access.10

The ECT Act 2021 (see B2 and C4) replaced a 2009 law, which had afforded the government sweeping surveillance powers with little to no oversight.11

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 3.003 5.005

Internet users in Zambia face harassment and intimidation for their online activities; they may face retaliation when criticizing the government online. In recent years, online journalists have also been physically attacked in the course of reporting.

In April 2022, town officials knocked on journalist Eric Chiyuka's phone to the ground and slapped him. Chiyuka, who works with the online publication CIC Press, had been taking photographs and videos of a physical altercation between police officers and members of a church. Later that day, he was detained and charged with two counts of assault (see C3).1

In May 2021, supporters of the PF attacked two journalists who had reported on an intraparty dispute. One of the journalists attacked was Francis Mwiinga Maingaila, a reporter with news site Zambia 24. Maingaila, who was left with face and eye injuries, says that the attackers seized his camera, phone, and wallet after he identified himself as a journalist. Nancy Malwele, a reporter at the New Vision newspaper, received a minor leg injury in the incident.2

Sishuwa Sishuwa, a prominent academic and commentator, faced a targeted campaign after he published a March 2021 article in online outlet News Diggers about the threat of public unrest ahead of the August elections. Government officials criticized Sishuwa for his analysis on social media and in online articles, including by requesting his arrest for sedition.3

In May 2021, police inspector general Kakoma Kanganja threatened to arrest attendees of a Zoom meeting led by Brian Sampa, the head of a doctors’ association who was purportedly suspended from practicing medicine.4 Civil society organizations sharply criticized the comments, characterizing them as an attempt to intimidate Zambians and curtail their rights to freedom of association and expression.5

Women regularly face harassment and bullying in online spaces. According to the Zambia National Women’s Lobby (ZNWL), women politicians faced cyberbullying and online sexual harassment while campaigning online ahead of the August 2021 elections.6

LGBT+ people are also targeted online, though few people openly identify as such because same-sex conduct is criminalized in Zambia.

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 3.003 3.003

Technical attacks against opposition activists, internet users, and journalists are uncommon in Zambia. Media organizations have reported difficulty in accessing their social media accounts, sometimes attributing the difficulty to technical attacks.

In May 2022, during the previous coverage period, Zambia’s Central Bank was hit with a ransomware attack that temporarily disrupted its operations.1 The bank’s ICT director stated that they did not engage in discussions with the hackers to regain lost data and claimed that no sensitive data had been leaked.2

In April 2019, the online news site Zambian Eye reported that its Facebook page had been hacked and that they had no administrative access. That same month, Radio Mano, a community radio station, reported that its Facebook page was hacked, though the station managed to restore control of the page.

In March 2021, the government passed the CSCCA (see C2), which seeks to strengthen Zambia’s capacity to defend against cyberattacks. The law empowers several authorities, including ZICTA, to coordinate and buttress cybersecurity in the country.3 In 2022, ZICTA intensified efforts to curb cybercrimes, particularly mobile money crimes by collaborating with mobile service providers to deactivate SIM cards used in perpetuating digital fraud and scams.4 In addition to deactivating these cards, in October 2022 ZICTA also introduced a short code for users to report scams and digital financial crimes.5

On Zambia

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Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    54 100 partly free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    59 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    Yes