Interventions for the 2022 OSCE Warsaw Human Dimension Conference

Ukraine: Accountability for Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Russian Federation in Crimea and Newly Occupied Areas of Ukraine

OSCE Human Dimension Conference 2022; Plenary Session II: Fundamental Freedoms

Freedom House strongly condemns the Russian Federation’s illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine. This assault by Russia, done in coordination with the Belarusian regime, is not only an assault on Ukraine, but on fundamental human rights and democracy itself. While the invasion has impacted every part of Ukrainian society, Freedom House calls upon the international community to hold the Russian regime and its armed forces accountable – in particular for the dire human rights situation in occupied Crimea, and in newly-occupied areas of Ukraine since February 24, 2022. According to reports and first-hand accounts, kidnapping, forced disappearances, torture, and a multitude of war crimes and other grave human rights violations have continued unabated in the newly-occupied territories of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions. In Crimea, the Russian occupational authorities have ramped up repression toward journalists, lawyers, and civic activists as a way to stamp out any dissent and maintain authoritarian rule. 

The discovery of a mass burial site containing 440 graves of Ukrainian civilians after the recent liberation of Izium and massive amounts of testimony and photographic evidence coming out of newly liberated areas give credibility to reports of grave human rights violations committed by Russian forces against civilians living in still-occupied areas. Every day, up to 200 Russian war crimes – including mass execution, torture, and kidnapping – are documented in areas recently liberated by Ukrainian forces. Meanwhile, testimony from those who escaped still-occupied areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia point to the persistent danger facing pro-Ukrainian activists, public officials, former Ukrainian law enforcement and veterans, as well as their relatives. The evacuation process from the newly-occupied territories is extremely difficult due to the danger of shelling, targeting by Russian soldiers, and other difficult conditions, resulting in the fact that most civilians remain trapped under occupation and in fear for their lives.

Additionally, local news outlets in newly-occupied areas have been stamped out, silenced, or seized for propaganda purposes. Access to Ukrainian TV is heavily restricted, and Russian-controlled service providers are now used for internet access from the occupied areas of Ukraine. According to the Institute of Mass Information, throughout the first seven months of the full-scale invasion, at least 215 broadcasters and online and print media outlets (national, regional, and local) have ceased their activities in whole or in part due to hostilities and occupation. These are mostly regional media outlets, including those from the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions.

In occupied Crimea following the full-scale invasion, Russian officials have ramped up campaigns targeting human rights activists, lawyers, citizen journalists, and Crimean Tatars. The case of Iryna Danilovych, a citizen‐journalist and activist who was held incommunicado in detention for a week before being accused on false charges, is emblematic of this repression. Activists in Crimea are targeted with detention on false charges, long sentences, and systemic violations of their right to a fair trial, demonstrating the pervasiveness and intensification of political persecution. In May 2022, four high profile lawyers were arrested and detained: prominent lawyer Edem Semedliaev, his defense lawyer Nazim Sheikhmambetov, as well as lawyers Aider Azamatov, and Emine Avamileva. In August 2022, three Crimean lawyers, Nazim Sheikhmambetov, Lilia Hemedzhi, and Rustem Kiamilev were stripped of their licenses to practice law by Russian authorities. These arbitrary detentions and reprisals against lawyers indicate that Russia has moved to a new level of repression.

The situation in Crimea and newly occupied territories of Ukraine require responses from OSCE participating States, OSCE institutions, and the EU, as well as continued responses from the Ukrainian government. Freedom House urges the following actions:

Freedom House calls on the Ukrainian authorities to:

• Create a coordination mechanism between civil society, law enforcement, and government to continue information sharing and evidence collection on kidnapped and detained people, and ensure their names are on prisoner exchange lists.
• Establish robust legislative and the institutional frameworks to independently investigate reports of Ukrainian citizens subjected to "filtration" camps, forced relocation, and displacement.
• Continue prioritizing securing proof of Russia's alleged war crimes as Ukraine liberates territory held by Russian forces.

To OSCE participating States and OSCE institutions, Freedom House urges the following:

• Provide technical and financial assistance that supports the Ukrainian government and civil society in the documentation of war crimes.
• Provide technical and financial assistance that supports activists, journalists, and human rights lawyers in Crimea.
• Increase international advocacy efforts calling attention to the detained, kidnapped, and missing people in newly occupied territories—including for the estimated million-plus Ukrainians that have been forcibly relocated to Russia—and for those jailed in Crimea. We urge the international community to call for their release.
• Provide support to the families of those detained or kidnapped and for the rehabilitation and reintegration of those released from captivity.
• Maintain and strengthen sanctions against occupational authorities in Crimea and newly occupied regions, as well as those in the Kremlin behind the invasion of Ukraine.
• Push for access of impartial monitors such as the UN and ICRC to Ukrainian prisoners of war, including an international mission to Olenivka to investigate the July 29 explosion at Olenivka prison.
• Condemn the recent sentencing of OSCE Special Monitoring Mission staff, Maxim Petrov and Dmytro Shabanov, to 13 years in prison for “treason” by Russia’s proxy regime in Luhansk

Transnational Repression in Eurasia

OSCE Human Dimension Conference 2022; Plenary Session II: Fundamental Freedoms 

Freedom House is gravely concerned about the threat faced by those advocating for human rights, freedom, and democracy from exile. Increasingly, authorities that have succeeded in stifling opposition inside their borders are seeking to silence the critical voices of activists, dissidents, and members of their diasporas living abroad using a range of physical, psychological, and digital tactics. Transnational repression – which occurs when governments reach across borders to harm, return, or control members of exiled communities – imperils not just the physical safety of activists, but also the democratic institutions and national security of the countries to which they have relocated.

The global reach of authoritarianism is shrinking spaces of refuge available to those seeking to escape political repression and human rights abuses. Freedom House has documented 285 incidents of physical transnational repression against individuals living in 33 OSCE member States between January 2014 and December 2021.1  Origin states of transnational repression are abusing mechanisms of legal cooperation, such as notices issued by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), as well as extradition requests, to have dissidents and political opponents detained or even returned from abroad. When autocrats are unable to secure formal cooperation, they have also used extralegal means to target individuals.

Although foreign dissidents across all OSCE countries are at risk of transnational repression, activists who have fled Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan face acute dangers. These governments are among the worst perpetrators, responsible for over 40 percent of all incidents of transnational repression recorded by Freedom House. Violence against activists that crosses borders is also on the rise in the region. In 2021, the vast majority of transnational repression incidents (over 70%) happened in Eurasia as a result of cooperation by authorities.

Belarus has emerged as an especially prolific perpetrator of transnational repression. In addition to committing air piracy to abduct Roman Protasevich and Sofia Sapega from a commercial flight in May 2021 and seeking the extradition of an activist from Poland in September,2 Belarusian authorities were able to kidnap, detain, or extradite 20 individuals from Russia. Alexander Fyaduta and Youras Ziankovich were both snatched from the streets of Moscow and brought to Minsk thanks to cooperation between the Russian FSB and Belarusian KGB.3  Sergei Nepogoda and Alyaksey Kudzin were extradited to Belarus from Russia and eventually convicted on charges connected to their participation in election protests.4  Kudzin was returned despite an order against his extradition by the European Court of Human Rights citing concerns about torture and ill treatment. Yana Pinchuk was extradited to Belarus in August of this year after spending nine months in detention in St. Petersburg. She faces up to 20 years in prison for running a Telegram channel that was critical of the Belarusian regime.5

Freedom House urges OSCE participating States to recognize the dangers posed to exiled activists living inside their borders and to:

• Ensure that law enforcement, migration agencies, and courts are insulated from the influence of foreign governments seeking to extend their reach abroad to silence critical voices.
• Issue travel advisories about States that engage in transnational repression, enabling citizens and residents to make informed decisions about whether and where to travel abroad.
• Develop proactively outreach strategies to inform members of targeted diaspora communities about protections available to them.
• Establish a specific mechanism to track domestic incidents of transnational repression and identify the perpetrator governments.
• Review extradition, Interpol notices, legal cooperation, readmission and return, and intelligence-sharing agreements with governments that engage in transnational repression.
• Support and impose targeted sanctions on perpetrators and enablers of transnational repression.
• Expel diplomats that engage in the harassment or targeting of diasporas.

Finally, Freedom House condemns the acts of transnational repression committed by OSCE-participating States and implores the perpetrators to cease such activities and respect the fundamental rights of expression and association.

• 1Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and the United States.
• 2 https://dorzeczy.pl/obserwator-mediow/200012/bialoruski-opozycjonista-m…
• 3 https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/06/europe/belarus-abduction-youras-ziankovi…
• 4https://belsat.eu/news/17-09-2021-yashche-adnamu-belarusu-pagrazhae-pry…;  https://memohrc.org/en/news_old/russian-authorities-violated-un-convent…
• 5https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-extradites-activist-pinchuk-belarus/3198…

Defending Belarusian Civil Society in the Face of Lukashenka’s Overwhelming Repression

OSCE Human Dimension Conference 2022; Plenary Session II: Fundamental Freedoms 

It has been two years since Alyaksandr Lukashenka rigged the 2020 presidential election in Belarus and brutally cracked down on the peaceful, mass protests that ensued in the months that followed. His illegitimate regime continues to crack down on all forms of dissent, activism, and solidarity, further shrinking of freedom of association and eroding the rule of law. Civil society organizations, human rights defenders, activists, journalists, and government critics are the main targets of Lukashenka’s regime. Since August 2020, at least 15 people have been killed, and more than 2,500 politically-motivated criminal cases have been initiated. Over 44,000 people have been subjected to administrative arrests and fines. Thousands of detainees have been tortured, some were raped, and many more have experienced psychological trauma.

As of today, there are approximately 1,338 political prisoners in Belarus, imprisoned on false or trumped-up charges for resisting Lukashenka’s regime. Among them are about a dozen prominent human rights defenders including Human Right Center Viasna’s Ales Bialiatski, Valiantsin Stefanovich, and Marfa Rabkova. Not only is the number of political prisoners continuously growing, their treatment has been violent and inhumane. Beatings, physical searches, and other humiliating tactics are common. Reports indicate that cells are often overcrowded, under-ventilated, and sometimes completely devoid of mattresses. Guards have been known to subject detainees and prisoners to other forms of mistreatment amounting to torture, such as leaving the lights on at all hours, blasting loud music, throwing buckets of bleach on the floor of their cells as a method of punishment. Earlier this month, Belarusian activist Stsyapan Latypau, who is serving an eight-and-a-half-year term, swallowed a razor blade and cut his wrists to protest his inhumane treatment in jail. In May 2021, while still in pre-trial detention, he stabbed himself in the neck with a pen in court after stating his desire to avoid the dreaded “pressure chamber” in which he had already spent fifty-one days; he ultimately survived this suicide attempt.

In July 2021, Lukashenka proclaimed that “various” non-governmental organizations and Belarus-based foreign media were engaged in terror under the guise of spreading democracy. As a result, at least 519 NGOs were liquidated by the regime, and 338 more NGOs opted for voluntary dissolution, often under pressure from the Ministry of Justice. These organizations included groups focusing on human rights, rights of people with disabilities, environment, youth development, victims of domestic violence, sick children, sport, literature, art, and even stray animals. Deprived of any legal status, some organizations continued working without registration choosing to continue to provide their services despite the risks. In January 2022, to apply even more pressure on civil society organizations the regime introduced law №144-Z introducing criminal liability for participating in activities by unregistered organizations thus criminalizing constituent engagement with CSOs. As a result of the relentless pressure, many civil society groups went underground and reduced their activities. Others relocated their teams abroad, registered new legal bodies there, and resumed operations. Some CSOs chose to fully suspend their activities. 

Lukashenka’s crackdown on Belarusian civil society has resulted in tens of thousands of politically-active citizens (both experienced and first-time activists), human rights defenders, and journalists being forced to relocate outside of Belarus for safety. Belarusian activists in exile and relocated organizations have been successful supporting their countrymen from abroad. Additionally, many have mobilized to support Ukraine and its efforts to defend their country; for example, by fundraising for humanitarian assistance. There are many civic groups who continue to operate inside the country despite great personal risk. This mass exodus of civic actors does not mean that no one has remained in the country. Financial assistance for Belarusian civil society is concentrated on supporting relocated CSOs to work from exile. Too little support reaches civic actors inside the country.  

Freedom House condemns the systemic crackdown on Belarusian civil society and its grotesque mistreatment of political prisoners. We urge OSCE institutions and participating States to hold the illegitimate Lukashenka regime responsible for its blatant violation of the Belarusian people’s right to peaceful assembly and association, and we urge the OSCE to seek the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners. Additionally, Freedom House urges OSCE-participating States and institutions to:

• Support families of political prisoners and assist released political prisoners with support - including emergency rehabilitation, employment opportunities, and mental and physical well-being assistance. 
• Simplify and expedite the process of legalizing the temporary stay and work authorizations for Belarusian activists who have relocated to other OSCE-participating States. 
• Provide assistance to civil society organizations who had to relocate from Belarus (but continue to do their important work) by simplifying the process of opening bank accounts, registering new legal entities, and providing short-term financial support to bolster their resilience. 
• Increase the availability of long-term support for a broad variety of civic efforts in and outside Belarus that seek to protect and advance fundamental human rights and freedoms of the Belarusian people.

Freedom House calls on the Lukashenka regime to:

• Immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and cease their persecution.
• Respect the right of the Belarusian people to peacefully organize and express a plurality of political views.
• Cease allowing the Russian military to use Belarusian territory for its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.
• Implement all ODIHR recommendations in organizing and conducting free and fair national elections in accordance to OSCE standards.

Freedom and Safety of Journalists in Azerbaijan and Turkey

OSCE Human Dimension Conference 2022; Plenary Session IV: Fundamental Freedoms

Freedom House is gravely concerned by the increasing trend of attacks and intimidation against journalists in Turkey and Azerbaijan. Over the last year, physical violence, punitive legal measures, smear campaigns, and other forms of harassment have been used to silence critical voices in Azerbaijan and Turkey, including the voices of minority groups. In Turkey, there has been a sharp decline in media freedom under President Erdoğan. Currently, more than 90 percent of Turkey’s media outlets are directly or indirectly controlled by the ruling Justice and Development Party.

The first risk to the safety of journalists working in Turkey is the constant threat of judicial proceedings in retaliation for their professional activities. Information collected by Turkish rights-focused civil society organizations shows that journalists are regularly investigated, imprisoned, tried, and convicted for their work. More than 56 journalists are currently imprisoned in Turkey. Between July 2021 and July 2022, at least 318 journalists were tried in Turkey – the majority on terror-related charges. In June, for example, sixteen Kurdish journalists based in Diyarbakır were arrested on terror-related charges without indictment.

Furthermore, between July 2021 and July 2022, more than two dozen journalists were tried for defying the “Law on Meetings and Demonstrations” – indicating that attending and reporting on demonstrations, a necessary part of their work, is increasingly being used as evidence in indictments. During the same period, 82 journalists were tried on charges of either ‘insulting’ a public official or the president, despite the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruling in October 2021 that the relevant Turkish Penal Code Article is incompatible with freedom of expression.

Equally of concern, in May 2022, lawmakers from the ruling AKP party proposed a draft bill expected to pass this autumn to criminalize the spread of disinformation. If passed, this “disinformation law” will introduce prison sentences of up to three years for disseminating misleading information about “the internal and external security of the country, public order, and public health.” The ambiguous definition of “disinformation” and “intent” as well as a highly politicized judiciary deciding on these cases raises credible concerns that the application of the law will be abused to target critical dissent in both traditional and social media. This law would allow the government to impose further restrictions on social media and put millions of Turkish social media users in peril for posting information critical of the government, which in turn would likely lead to even more self-censorship.

In Azerbaijan, freedom of expression and media freedom are under constant pressure. Journalists are consistently harassed to the point where many have fled the country, while independent or opposition media have been shut down or blocked online, with nearly all media outlets controlled by the government. Overall, journalists are working under dire conditions, and independent media portals frequently face blockages. In Azerbaijan, according to a report from the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center, in 2022 alone more than 20 politically motivated cases were opened against activists, civil society representatives, bloggers, human rights defenders, and journalists. The targeting of journalists by law-enforcement bodies included detention, arbitrary arrests, and intimidation. A recent report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also noted this worrying trend of suspicious attacks on government critics. In Azerbaijan, journalists are also subjected to surveillance. In July 2021, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) reported that several Azerbaijani journalists were among those targeted with Pegasus spyware, reportedly at the behest of the Azerbaijani government. Ordinary citizens are also victims of government attacks on freedom of expression; Azerbaijan is one of at least 55 countries where government authorities investigated, arrested, or convicted citizens for their social media posts.

Additionally, a new Law on Media in Azerbaijan has introduced limits to collecting information in matters of military, state, and counterterrorism. With this law, which has drawn criticism from the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, the government can label journalists as either legitimate or not. Moreover, if a media outlet is found to accept foreign funding or if its director does not meet strict residency requirements, it can be suspended or shut down permanently. Many independent Azeri journalists work from exile and publish their work on social media – actions that could also be targeted under the new law. 

Freedom House urges OSCE participating States to hold the Turkish and Azerbaijani governments accountable for failing to ensure freedom of expression and protect journalists and, in several cases, for contributing to the systemic harassment and violence against them. Media freedom is crucial to the democratic ideals of the OSCE mechanism and can only be achieved when journalists can operate in a safe environment without fear of unjust political persecution. Specifically, we urge OSCE participating States and the Council of Europe to:

• In bilateral engagement with the governments of Turkey and Azerbaijan, raise concerns about the significant and dangerous lack of media pluralism in both countries and urge them to improve the situation in line with their OSCE commitments.
• Prioritize freedom of expression cases pending at the ECtHR and urge both countries to implement the ECtHR rulings concerning freedom of expression.

Additionally, we call on the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media to:

• Closely monitor new measures by Turkish and Azerbaijani authorities that undermine media freedom and journalist safety, as well as Turkey’s draft “disinformation law” described above, and develop recommendations to improve media freedom in both countries.
• Increase efforts to ensure the safety of journalists in Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Freedom House calls on the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkey to:

• Refrain from introducing new measures that would further restrict freedom of expression and ensure their commitments to OSCE principles.
• Cease politically motivated persecution of journalists from minority communities (Kurdish journalists in Turkey).
• Ensure that criminal and anti-terror legislation is not applied in a manner that limits or suppresses freedom of expression. 

Reforming the Framework for Media Freedom in Moldova

OSCE Human Dimension Conference 2022; Plenary Session IV: Fundamental Freedoms

Over the last year, the Party of Action and Solidarity government in Moldova has expressed interest in promoting media freedom to bolster its democratic agenda. Despite the government’s avowed commitment to media reform, challenges to access to information, media independence, and pluralism persist. While Freedom House commends the government’s desire to achieve progress and engage civil society in these reforms, efforts to improve access to information and ensure media diversity have not been sufficient.

The previous parliament's efforts to improve media freedom, including the Audiovisual Media Service Code, represented a step toward engaging civil society and international stakeholders on improving media legislation and policy; however, the overall agenda launched in 2017 is incomplete and in need of reform.
  
Shortcomings in the draft Law on Access to Information and its poor enforcement continue to affect journalists’ ability to ensure the public’s right to truth and objective information. Journalists who cover politicized issues, such as corruption, are sometimes intimidated by government officials and informal interest in various ways, including through physical harassment, smear campaigns, and, in the recent past, even the initiation of contraventional proceedings with fines. Additionally, the Law on Access to Information is undermined by privacy protections for officials and is often invoked to refuse the release of legitimate information of public interest. Finally, pressure and strategic litigation efforts pursued by civil society organizations such as “Lawyers for Human Rights” have yielded rulings that underscore the primacy of this law in ensuring citizens’ right to access information. It will be essential for the government moving forward to address the shortcomings in the law by reforming it or adopting a new law.

In 2021, Freedom House published its Freedom of Information Index: Measuring Transparency of Public Institutions in Moldova report, a comprehensive analysis on access to information in Moldova as well as the transparency of public institutions. The report focused both on the quality of existing legislation and the ensuing regulations for the Moldovan government. The assessment found gaps in the legislative requirements and the actual practice of disclosing information. 

Concerns persist regarding the transparency and independence of the Audiovisual Council, a nominally autonomous media regulatory body. In response to rushed amendments in December 2021 allowing for parliamentary dismissal of members of the Audiovisual Council, civil society warned that this decision could increase politicization of the Audiovisual Council. The Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM) presented a legal analysis of the amendments to the Audiovisual Media Service Code and found that the newly passed amendments led to increased parliamentary control over the public service broadcaster TeleRadio-Moldova (TRM) and the Audiovisual Council. The RFoM underlined the importance of independence of these public institutions and called on authorities to revisit the legal framework related to freedom of broadcasting to ensure its full compliance with international human rights standards and OSCE commitments. 

Concentration of media ownership is another factor that continues to undermine media pluralism in Moldova. Although the Audiovisual Code restricts a single owner from holding more than two broadcast licenses, this legal norm has had a negligible practical impact. The Competition Council has continually failed to adequately fulfill its mandate to prevent or address potentially dominant positions in the media market, and the anti-monopoly provisions currently enshrined in national legislation are not effective or realistic. In March 2022, Parliament adopted a new draft Law on Advertising, which addresses important legal gaps. However, it will only enter into force in 2023 and will not address political advertising. 

Freedom House commends the Moldovan government for its recognition of these challenges and its level of demonstrated commitment to making progress on media reform. We urge the Moldovan government and parliament to move from statements to action. With the recent decision to grant Moldova candidate status in the European Union, Moldovan authorities along with civil society have an opportunity to create a robust environment where independent media can thrive. 

Freedom House calls on OSCE participating States, and the Representative of Freedom of the Media (RFoM) to: 

• Continue to offer assistance in encouraging Moldova’s media reform efforts, including reviews of legislative, regulatory, and procedural frameworks to uphold media freedom.
• Freedom House calls on the Moldovan government and parliament to:
• Adopt a new Law on Access to Information within the Moldovan parliament that prioritizes transparency and access to public-interest information in accordance with international obligations, as well as oversight of public authorities by civil society. Ensure effective remedies for unjustified cases of refusal of access to information or those involving institutions ignoring public information requests.
• Reconvene the parliamentary working group on media legislation to focus on the improvement, review, and passage of the Law on Freedom of Expression, the Law on Data Protection, and other laws in close consultation with civil society.
• In consultation with the RFoM, ensure robust enforcement of the Audiovisual Media Service Code by the Competition Council and Audiovisual Council to facilitate greater media pluralism and editorial independence.
• Commit to allowing journalists the unimpeded ability to offer objective and fact-based information without intimidation or harassment, and commit to fully investigating and prosecuting any violation of journalists’ rights.

Seeking Justice for the Victims of the January 2022 Unrest in Kazakhstan

OSCE Human Dimension Conference 2022; Plenary Session IV: Rule of Law

Peaceful protests over the rise in fuel prices in western Kazakhstan, which began in early January 2022, rapidly spread across the country and began to take on a political character, as citizens demanded broader reforms and a more representative government. However, over time, some of the peaceful demonstrations turned violent and resulted in armed clashes with police. With this upsurge in violence came a crackdown on citizens’ freedom to obtain information and assemble, as well as an increase in the indiscriminate use of force by state security services. By suspending access to the internet, the government effectively cut off Kazakhstani citizens from the outside world and one another, making it difficult for ordinary people to document and share information about the brutal government response in real time.

Instead of discriminating between peaceful protests and violent marauders, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to quell the unrest and issued a shoot-to-kill order to his security forces against the protestors. While CSTO peacekeepers guarded strategic facilities, researchers and eyewitnesses testify that police and military fired indiscriminately on protesters and rioters, killing at least ten people. On January 11, UN human rights experts called on the Kazakhstani authorities and security forces to halt their unrestrained use of force—including lethal force—against protesters, and called for an independent investigation into the government’s use of force against protesters.

In the days following the unrest, over 10,000 people were detained. Human rights defenders have reported violations of peaceful protesters’ right to life, arbitrary arrests, the torture of detainees, and limited access for detainees to lawyers. According to Kazakhstani authorities, 232 people died during the January unrest, including nineteen security officials. The Prosecutor General’s Office stated that six more detainees died of torture in pre-trial detention centers. A wave of complaints on the widespread use of torture swept across the country as well. Human rights advocates documented the cases of hundreds of victims.

In response to the unrest, President Tokayev tasked the Prosecutor General’s Office with carrying out an in-depth investigation. The report stated that the authorities had received 301 allegations of torture, ill-treatment and “unlawful investigation methods” and that 243 criminal cases had been opened into such allegations. The number of violations is believed to be significantly higher than the number of complaints officially registered, however, due to victims’ fears of repercussions and a lack of trust in the criminal justice system. The report found that four months later only fifteen suspects among the 243 cases were identified, and only nine were detained. Kazakhstani authorities also released the surnames of victims, without sufficient identifying information to enable independent verification, drawing criticism from human rights groups.

Of the many detentions during this period, 44 individuals are reportedly being held on suspicion of terrorism in the pre-trial detention facility of the National Security Committee (KNB). To date, information on these 44 cases has not been publicly disclosed, and only lawyers with the appropriate security clearance can represent the accused. Freedom House considers this a violation of the right of accused individuals to select their own legal representation. Moreover, advocates, selected by the state and granted access to secret materials, rarely cooperate with journalists and human rights activists in Kazakhstan.

Freedom House is also concerned that 32 criminal cases have been brought against political opposition and civic activists in the aftermath of January 2022, including against the leader of the unregistered Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, Zhanbolat Mamay, as well as against supporters of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and Koshe Partiisy (Street Party) movements, which have unjustifiably been banned for extremism in Kazakhstan.

Freedom House urges OSCE institutions and participating States to call for justice for the victims of the January 2022 unrest as well as transparency for any investigations therein.

Freedom House calls on the Kazakhstani government to:

1. Provide justice for the victims of the January 2022 unrest, by ensuring that each case is thoroughly investigated and that perpetrators are brought to justice in fair trials. Those who were tortured should be given compensation by the State.
2. Provide a comprehensive list of victims’ names and other identifying information, as well as the cause and circumstances of their deaths.
3. Cease using the January 2022 unrest as a pretext for oppressing political opposition and activist activities.
4. Provide access to information on all cases involving “terrorism” charges and cease using bogus accusations of terrorism to hinder legitimate protests.
5. Commit to protecting a free, open, easily accessible, and reliable internet.
6. Cooperate with civil society on the transparent investigation of human rights abuses in January 2022 and the aftermath.